




DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS 
   
 
 
Pollution Abatement as a Source of 








Theodore Palivos, University of Macedonia, Greece 









Working Paper No. 11/04 
October 2010 
   1 
 
 
Pollution Abatement as a Source of 




a  Dimitrios Varvarigos
b 
Department of Economics 
University of Macedonia  
Greece 
Department of Economics 









In a two period overlapping generations model with production, we consider 
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environmental preservation proves crucial for both the economy’s short term 
dynamics  and  its  long term  prospects.  Particularly,  an  active  policy  of 
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growth. Furthermore, by eliminating the occurrence of limit cycles, pollution 
abatement is also a powerful source of stabilisation. 
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1   Introduction 
In recent years, environmental issues have gained prominence in both academic and political 
discussions. At the same time, they have received considerable media attention. Problems 
such as the emission of greenhouse gases and their impact on global warming, the depletion 
of natural resources, and the hazardous chemicals/toxins that contaminate the food and 
water supplies and deteriorate the quality of air, are major issues of concern. This is, of 
course, not surprising given their significant direct and indirect repercussions for our health 
characteristics and, therefore, our overall quality of life (e.g., Pimentel et al., 1998; Donohoe, 
2003; Lacasaña et al., 2005).
1       
     Naturally, economic growth has been an indispensable aspect of all this focus, attention 
and discussion – after all, environmental degradation is a by product of economic activities 
such as production and consumption. One point of view focuses on this latter idea, as well 
as the economic importance of a prosperous natural environment, so as to suggest that 
societies,  and  their  policy  makers  in  particular,  should  shift  their  attention  away  from 
economic growth and towards policies and actions that preserve environmental quality (e.g., 
Daly and Cobb, 1989; Arrow et al., 1995). Otherwise, the reckless and short sighted quest for 
economic prosperity today will deteriorate the quality of the environment bestowed to future 
generations to the extent of severely undermining their prospects for economic prosperity, 
as well as their ability to support a meaningful quality of life. Another point of view discards 
the  aforementioned  arguments.  It  is  based  on  empirical  analyses  (e.g.,  Grossman  and 
Krueger, 1995; Hilton and Levinson, 1998; Millimet et al., 2003; Aslanidis and Xepapadeas, 
2008)  that  derive  environmental  Kuznets  curves  (EKCs)  as  well  as  theoretical  analyses 
which, in a similar vein, imply that economic activity may actually represent a benefit, rather 
than a cost, for environmental quality (e.g., John and Pecchenino, 1994; Ono, 2003; Mariani 
et al., 2010).
2  
     Careful inspection into the ideas and mechanisms behind each of the aforementioned 
points of view can reveal that both of them have their shortcomings. The proponents of the 
former  view  fail  to  acknowledge  the  implications  of  their  suggestions  for  persistent 
unemployment, poverty, lack of investment in infrastructure, education, health services etc. – 
issues  of  particular  importance  for  both  developed  and  developing  economies.  Sadly, 
                                                 
1 Pimentel et al. (1998) estimate that the direct and indirect impacts of environmental degradation can account 
for almost 40% of deaths worldwide. 
2 The EKC is an inverse U shaped relationship between measures of pollution and per capita GDP.   3 
however, the shortcomings of the opposing view seem to be equally serious. To begin with, 
the EKC, rather than being generally accepted as a stylised fact, is probably the single most 
contested issue in the environmental economics literature. A significant number of analyses 
have  criticised  both  the  methodological  framework  and  the  interpretation  of  the  results 
supporting the EKC, while others have failed to reproduce co movements in measures of 
pollution and income that resemble EKCs (e.g., Perman and Stern, 2003; Dijkgraaf and 
Vollebergh, 2005; Azomahou et al., 2006). Furthermore, many of the existing theoretical 
analyses assume that the environmental impacts of pollutant emissions and activities such as 
environmental maintenance and pollution abatement are additively separable. Coupled with 
the assumption that individuals internalise the environmental effects of their own (polluting) 
consumption  and  environmental  maintenance  decisions,  additive  separability  allows  the 
latter to dominate the former. Consequently, given that both consumption and maintenance 
are proportional to income, the dynamics of environmental quality actually improve with 
higher incomes.  
     Of course, such results invite criticism because outcomes in which the environmental 
benefit  of  activities  targeted  at environmental support  could  be  greater  than  the  overall 
environmental cost of pollution – a cost that they are supposed to mitigate in the first place 
– appear to be unrealistic. In fact, other papers that employ additively separable effects for 
pollution  and  abatement/environmental  maintenance,  recognise  this  shortcoming  and 
address it by imposing a non negativity constraint that requires the environmental cost of 
emissions to dominate the benefit from abatement. Roussillon and Schweinzer (2010) justify 
this  restriction  on  the  basis  that  “requiring  non negative  differences  in  the  damage 
function…ensures that reductive efforts cannot substitute productive efforts” (p. 4, footnote 
5). Economides and Philippopoulos (2008) use a similar restriction, arguing that the scenario 
for which environmental maintenance is stronger than the polluting effect of production is 
“too good to be true” (p. 213).  
     In this paper, we show that an equilibrium with (environmentally) sustainable long run 
growth is possible, despite the fact that economic growth has a net damaging effect on 
environmental quality (irrespective on whether pollution is abated or not) and even though  
the quality of the environment is essential for supporting longevity and, therefore, saving and 
capital accumulation. We build a two period overlapping generations model in which labour 
productivity is enhanced by an aggregate learning by doing externality. Despite the fact that 
this type of externality is the source of aggregate constant returns that could potentially allow   4 
an equilibrium with positive growth rate in the long run, when pollution is left unabated in 
our model, the economy cannot achieve such an equilibrium. Instead, as long as there is a 
sufficient initial endowment of capital stock, the economy will either converge to a positive 
stationary  level  for  capital  per  worker  or  to  a  stable  cycle  in  which  capital  per  worker 
oscillates permanently around its (non stationary) equilibrium. Nevertheless, when resources 
are devoted towards pollution abatement, then equilibrium outcomes change drastically. In 
this  case,  an economy  that  is  sufficiently  endowed  with  capital  in  the initial period  can 
achieve  an  equilibrium  in  which  both  capital  per  worker  and  output  per  worker  grow 
constantly in the long run. Economic growth is environmentally sustainable, since a positive 
level  of  environmental  quality  is  maintained.  This  occurs  in  spite  of  the  non separable 
environmental  effects  of  pollutant  emissions  and  abatement  –  meaning  that  economic 
activity still entails environmental costs, notwithstanding the resources devoted to pollution 
abatement.
3 
     In the last main section of our analysis, we endogenise the government’s expenditure 
allocation. In particular, we consider the case where the public sector allocates its spending 
between public health care and environmental activities so as to maximise the life expectancy 
of the economy’s population. The first main outcome from this procedure echoes the result 
of  Stokey  (1998)  in  that the  government  finds  optimal  to  initiate any spending  towards 
environmental support only after the economy’s capital resources exceed a certain threshold. 
Casual  empirical  observation  suggests  that  actual  economies  tend  to  engage  in  active 
environmental  preservation  only  at  later  stages  of  their  development  process  –  hence, 
providing  support  for  our  theoretical  result.  We  also  show  that,  once  the  government 
supports  pollution  abatement  activities  optimally,  the  economy  may  sustain  economic 
growth in the long run while the dynamics do not converge to endogenous cycles.   
     Our results can be viewed as addressing the shortcomings of the two opposite views on 
the environment economic growth nexus to which we alluded earlier. On the one hand, we 
show that sustainable economic growth is possible even though growth is detrimental to 
environmental quality, for which some sufficient degree is essential for a meaningful human 
existence.  On  the  other  hand,  we  show  that  environmentally  sustainable  growth  is  not 
                                                 
3 The possibility of endogenous fluctuations in models of capital accumulation and environmental quality has 
been also identified by Zhang (1999), Ono (2003) and Seegmuller and Verchère (2004). All of them employ the 
John  and  Peccherino  (1994)  framework  to  introduce  environmental  quality;  thus,  the  mechanism  of 
endogenous cycles differs from ours. In our model, cycles may emerge because unbounded environmental 
degradation, and its impact on longevity, introduces non monotonicity in the dynamics of capital accumulation.      5 
achieved because economic growth will miraculously solve all environmental problems or 
because the benefit from activities of environmental maintenance is inexplicably stronger 
that  the  environmental  cost  of  pollution.  Sustainable  growth  can  be  achieved  on  the 
condition  that  societies  devote  some  of  their  resources  towards  actions  and  policies  of 
environmental preservation, even if the utmost that such policies and actions can achieve is 
just to moderate the extent of environmental degradation. As long as they can achieve this, 
they are still crucial for deterring economic prosperity from being associated with the kind of 
unbounded environmental decay that could gravely undermine human existence. 
     The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 sets up the economic model. In 
Section 3 we analyse the different equilibrium outcomes of the model, according to whether 
pollution abatement is active or not. In Section 4, we discuss some important implications 
from our analysis and in Section 5 we consider the case where the government’s expenditure 
towards pollution abatement is determined optimally. Section 6 summarises and concludes.               
                  
2   The Economic Framework 
We construct an overlapping generations economy in which time, indicated by  = … 0,1,2, t , 
is measured in discrete intervals that represent periods. The economy is populated by an 
infinite sequence of agents who face a potential lifetime of two periods. In particular, an 
agent will live during the period following her birth, i.e., her youth, but she may or may not 
survive to her old age. We assume that, before her survival prospect is realised, each agent 
reproduces asexually and gives birth to an offspring. Thus, the prospect of untimely death 
does not have any repercussions for the population mass of newly born agents, whose size 
we normalise to one.  
     During youth, each agent is endowed with one unit of labour. She supplies her labour to 
firms (inelastically), which compensate her by providing a salary denoted by  t w . Even if she 
survives to maturity, nature does not bestow to her the ability to work when old, therefore 
t w  is her only source of income during her lifetime. For this reason, and in order to satisfy 
her  possible  future  consumption  needs,  she  deposits  an  amount  t s ,  when  young,  to  a 
financial intermediary that promises to repay it next period, augmented by the gross interest 
rate  1 t r + .   6 
     As mentioned earlier, survival to maturity is not certain. Particularly, we assume that a 
young person will survive to maturity with probability  [0,1) t β Î  whereas with probability 
1 t β -  she dies prematurely. Furthermore, we assume that life expectancy is endogenous in 
the sense that the agent’s survival prospect depends on her health characteristics (or health 
status), denoted as  t h , according to
4   
  Β( ) t t β h = ,  (1) 
where  Β( ) 0 t h ¢ > ,  Β ( ) 0 t h ¢¢ < ,  Β(0) 0 = ,  Β( ) λ ¥ = ,  (0,1) λÎ ,  Β(0) ψ ¢ = ,  (0,1) ψÎ ,  and 
Β( ) 0 ¢ ¥ = . Thus, we employ essentially the same assumptions used by Chakraborty (2004) in 
his seminal analysis of endogenous lifetime and economic growth.
5  
     We delve further into the determinants of life expectancy by assuming that an agent’s 
health  status  depends  positively  on  the  extent  to  which  the  government  supports  the 
provision  of  health  services  t g   (e.g.,  public  hospitals,  the  presence  of  a  national  health 
system,  preventive  measures,  funding  and  support  of  medical  research,  the  design  and 
implementation  of  health  and  safety  rules  etc.),  and  on  the  quality  of  the  natural 
environment  t e  (e.g., the cleanliness of air, soil and water, the relative abundance of natural 




t t t h g e = ,     (2) 
where 0 1 φ < <  and 0 1 χ < < .
6 
      All  choices  made  by  an  agent  during  her  lifetime  are  governed  by  her  ex  ante  (i.e., 
expected) lifetime utility function  
  1 ln ln
t t t
t t t V c β c + = + ,     (3) 
where 
t
t c  and  1
t
t c +  denote the levels of consumption during youth and old age respectively.
7  
It should be noted that we employ the notational standard of using subscripts to indicate the 
period of birth and subscripts to indicate the period at which events take place.   
                                                 
4 An agent’s expected lifetime at birth is equal to  2 1 1 t t t β β β + - = +  periods. For this reason, we shall be using 
such terms as ‘life expectancy’, ‘longevity’ and ‘survival probability’ interchangeably.    
5 Other analyses that incorporate life expectancy in this manner include Blackburn and Cipriani (2002) and 
Bhattacharya and Qiao (2007) among others. 
6 The limiting case for which  =1 φ  and  = 0 χ  is examined by Chakraborty (2004). In his paper, he does not 
consider issues pertaining to the natural environment. 
7 We assume that child rearing costs are incorporated in a person’s consumption expenditures when young.   7 
     There  is  a  single,  perishable  commodity  through  which  agents  can  satisfy  their 
consumption needs. It is produced by perfectly competitive firms who combine physical 
capital,  t K  (which they rent from financial intermediaries at a price of  t R  per unit), and 





t t t t Y K L , 0 1 γ < < ,     (4) 
where Αt  is assumed to be positively related to the economy’s average amount of capital,  t K  
(e.g., Frankel, 1962; Romer, 1986). Thus, it captures the idea that workers gain knowledge 
and become more productive by handling more capital goods – knowledge that spreads 
costlessly over the whole economy in the manner of an externality. Formally,  
    = Α Α t t K ,    > Α 0.  (5) 
     One unfortunate by product from firms’ activities is pollution. We assume that one unit 
of produced output generates  0 p >  units of pollutant emissions, therefore total pollution is 
given by   
  t t P pY = .  (6) 
     Although pollution is the major determinant of environmental degradation,  t D , the latter 
can be mitigated by government funded activities that are designed and implemented so as 
to reduce the extent of environmental damage for given levels of pollutant emissions. We 
may think of recycling facilities, wastewater management facilities, installation and operation 
of renewable energy techniques that reduce the emission of greenhouse gases and toxic 
pollutants  (e.g.,  wind  turbines,  hydroelectric  plants  and  solar  photovoltaics),  clean up 
operations,  etc.  For  the  purposes  of  our  analysis,  we  shall  refer  to  them  as  pollution 
abatement  activities,  and  denote  them  by  0 t a ³ .  Environmental  degradation  is,  hence, 











.  (7) 
     Given the aforementioned arguments, the quality of the natural environment,  0 t e ³ , 










E D D E
e ,  (8)   8 
where  0 E > .
8      
     Note that, according to (7), the environmental impacts of pollution and abatement are 
not separable. Given that, in equilibrium, both of them are proportional to income, higher 
production  will  always  entail  environmental  degradation  and  net  environmental  costs  – 
irrespective on whether pollution is abated ( > 0 t a ) or not ( = 0 t a ). This is an important 
deviation of our paper in comparison to some existing models on the relationship between 
economic  growth  and  the  environment  (e.g.,  John  and  Pecchenino,  1994;  Ono,  2003; 
Mariani et al., 2010).    
     We complete our analysis of the economy’s structure with a discussion on the process 
under which the government finances its activities. We utilise the widely used assumption 
that  the  government  imposes  a  flat  tax  rate  (0,1) τ Î   on  firms’  production  revenues. 
Assuming that the government abides by a balance budget rule in each period, our previous 
assumptions imply that  t t t g a τY + = . If we denote the fixed fraction of revenues devoted 
towards pollution abatement by  [0,1) υÎ , it is straightforward to establish that  
  (1 ) t t g υ τY = - ,  (9) 
and  
  t t a υτY = ,  (10) 
give the levels of public health spending and pollution abatement activities in relation to the 
economy’s total output, respectively.  
 
3   Temporary Equilibrium 
We begin our analysis with a description of the economy’s temporary equilibrium. This is 
provided in the form of 
 





1 1 , , , , , ,Α , , , , , , , , , ,
t t t
t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t c c c s L Y β h e D L P a g K K  and prices  } { 1 1 , , , t t t t w R R r + +   such 
that: 
                                                 
8 To maintain analytical convenience, we abstract from the dynamics of environmental quality by assuming that 
nature has the ability to completely regenerate and restore itself within a period. With a two period overlapping 
generations  setting,  in  which  a  period  may  include  many  years,  this  is  not  a  very  restrictive  assumption. 
Moreover, it has been used in the analyses of Stokey (1998), Jones and Manuelli (2001) and Hartman and 
Kwon (2005) among others.       9 
(i)  Given  t w ,  1 t r +  and  t β , the quantities 
t
t c ,  1
t
t c +  and  t s  solve the optimisation problem of a 
worker born at time t ;  
(ii)  Given  t w  and  t R , all firms choose quantities for  t L  and  t K  in order to maximise profits; 
(iii)  The labour market clears, i.e.,  1 t L = ; 




t t t t t t t Y c β c s g a
-
- = + + + + ; 
(v)  The financial market clears; 
(vi)  The government’s budget is balanced.  
 
     The objective of a young agent is to choose the levels of consumption, in both periods, 
and  saving  so  as  to  maximise 
t V   subject  to 
t
t t t c w s = -   and  1 1
t
t t t c r s + + =   respectively. 
Alternatively, given (3), the problem can be modified to  1
0 1 max{ln( ) ln( )}
t
t t t t t
s w s β r s +
£ £ - + . The 











.  (11) 
     Naturally,  the  prospect  of  premature  death  modifies  an  agent’s  saving  behaviour.  In 
terms of intuition, an increase in longevity raises the (expected) marginal utility of an agent’s 
consumption when old; therefore, to restore the equilibrium, the marginal utility derived 
from her first period consumption must increase as well. She can achieve this by choosing to 
save more and consume less while she is young. 
     Profit maximisation by firms entails that each input’s marginal product is equal to its 
respective price. Formally,    
 
- - - = - - = - -
1 1 (1 )(1 ) Α (1 )(1 ) Α
γ γ γ γ γ
t t t t t t w τ γ K L τ γ k ,  (12) 
and   
 
- - - - - = - = -
1 1 1 1 1 (1 ) Α (1 ) Α
γ γ γ γ γ
t t t t t t R τ γK L τ γk ,  (13) 
where  / t t t k K L =  is the amount of capital per worker. Using (5) together with the labour 
market  clearing  condition,  1 t L = ,  implies  that  t t t k K K = = .  Consequently,  using  the 






, we can write (12) and (13) as       
  (1 )(1 )Γ t t w τ γ k = - - ,  (14) 
and     10 
  ˆ (1 ) Γ   t R τ γ R = - º ,  (15) 
respectively.       
     There are two conditions that describe the financial market equilibrium. We assume that 
perfectly competitive financial intermediaries undertake the task of channelling capital from 
depositors to firms. Specifically, they transform saving deposits into capital by accessing a 
technology that  transforms  time t  output into  time  1 t +  capital on  a  one to one  basis. 
They,  subsequently,  supply  this  capital  to  firms  that  manufacture  the  economy’s  single 
commodity. Hence,  1 t t t K L s + =  or, in intensive form,  
  1 t t k s + = .  (16) 
      To resolve the issue of saving under an uncertain lifetime, we assume, following among 
others Chakraborty (2004), that financial intermediaries represent mutual funds that offer 
contingent annuities. Specifically, when accepting deposits, intermediaries promise to offer 
retirement  income  (in  our  case,  1 t t r s + )  provided  that  the  depositor  survives  to  old  age. 
Otherwise, the income of those who die is shared equally among surviving members of the 
mutual fund. Considering this assumption, and the fact that financial intermediaries operate 
under perfect competition, we have 
  1 1 ˆ
t t t β r R R + + = = ,  (17) 
which translates into the equilibrium condition requiring costs (i.e., the total return to all 
surviving savers) to be equal to revenues (i.e., the revenues they receive from firms who rent 
capital) – the reason being that financial intermediaries make zero economic profits from 
their activities.  
     Next, we can use the labour market clearing condition, together with (5), in equation (4) 
so as to obtain an expression for output per worker  / t t t y Y L = . That is,  
  Γ t t y k = .  (18) 
     If we combine the expression in (18) together with (1), (2), (6), (7), (8), (9) and (10), and 
substitute together with (11) and (14) in equation (16), we can eventually derive  
  +
   
  - -     +     = - - =
   
  + - -     +    
1
Γ
Β [(1 ) Γ ]
1 Γ
(1 )(1 )Γ ( )
Γ











υ τ k E
υτ k
k τ γ k z k
p k
υ τ k E
υτ k
.  (19)   11 
     Thus, we have reduced our model into a dynamical system of one first order difference 
equation  for  capital  per  worker.  The  analysis  of  this  equation  will  facilitate  us  in 
understanding the dynamics and the long run equilibrium of the economy. This is the issue 
to which we now turn our attention.
9   
 
3   Dynamic Equilibrium 
The economy’s dynamic equilibrium is formally described through     
 
Definition 2. For  0 0 k > , the dynamic equilibrium is a sequence of temporary equilibria that satisfy 
1 ( ) t t k z k + =  for every t . 
 
     We can facilitate our subsequent analysis by defining a new variable,  1 t θ + , which denotes 











+ = - .  (20) 
     Furthermore, our subsequent results will be further clarified with the use of     
             
Definition 3. Consider  0 0 k > . Then:  
(i)  If  1 lim 0 t t θ + ®¥ = ,  an  equilibrium  with  1 ˆ 0 t t k k k + = = >   is  a  ‘no  growth’  steady state 
equilibrium;  







+ = +  is a ‘long run growth’ equilibrium; 
(iii)  If  1 0 t t k k + = =  and lim 0 t t k
®¥ = , the equilibrium is a ‘poverty trap’. 
     
     Our purpose is to examine two scenarios which differ with respect to the government’s 
provision of pollution abatement services. As we shall see, the public sector’s stance on 
environmental protection has significant repercussions for both the economy’s dynamics and 
its long term prospects. Notice that all proofs to our subsequent results are relegated to an 
Appendix. Furthermore, the subsequent analysis will be utilising  
                                                 




(1 )(1 )Γ 1
1 Β( )
τ γ - - >
+






   
=     +    
,  
 
as well as  
 
Assumption 2.  χ φ £ . 
 
     The first restriction is essential for the existence of a meaningful long run equilibrium 
(see Footnote 10). The second one is not essential for our results and is employed purely for 
expositional purposes (see Footnote 12). It is actually relaxed in Appendix A5, where we 
show that our results still remain qualitatively similar.  
 
3.1   Dynamic Equilibrium without Pollution Abatement 
We begin our analysis with the case for which  0 υ =  – a case which translates into a scenario 
where the government is not actively engaged in policies of environmental preservation. 
Given (19), we have   
  ( )
( )
Β ( Γ ) ( Γ )
( ) (1 )(1 )Γ
1 Β ( Γ ) ( Γ )
φ χ
t t
t t φ χ
t t
τ k E p k
z k τ γ k




.  (21) 
     First, we are interested in obtaining the model’s steady state equilibria. These are fixed 
points of the map   ( ) z × , i.e., values  ˆ k of capital per worker that satisfy  ( ) ˆ ˆ k z k = . A formal 
analysis of (21) allows us to derive 
 
Lemma 1. There exist three steady state equilibria  1 ˆ k ,  2 ˆ k  and  3 ˆ k , such than  1 ˆ 0 k =  and  3 2 ˆ ˆ 0 k k > > . 
The steady state  1 ˆ k  is locally asymptotically stable,  2 ˆ k  is an unstable steady state, while  3 ˆ k  may be either 
locally asymptotically stable or unstable.  
   13 
     The result from Lemma 1 facilitates us in tracing the economy’s dynamic behaviour and 
transitional dynamics.
10 We can formally present these ideas in the form of  
 
Proposition 1. Consider  0 0 k > . Then:  
(i)  If  0 2 ˆ k k < , the economy will converge to the poverty trap  1 ˆ 0 k = ;  
(ii)  If  0 2 ˆ k k > , the economy will converge to a ‘no growth’ equilibrium. Particularly, if  3 ˆ k  is 
locally asymptotically stable, then it will also be the stationary equilibrium for the stock of 
capital per worker – otherwise, the economy will asymptotically converge to an equilibrium 
where capital per worker  displays permanent cycles around  3 ˆ k .    
 
     The different possible scenarios are depicted in Figures 1 3. In all different cases, we see 
that the point  2 ˆ k  acts as a natural threshold which allows history (approximated by the initial 
capital endowment) to determine the long term prospects of the economy. The model’s 
ability to generate multiple steady state equilibria rests on the beneficial effect of publicly 
provided health services on saving behaviour – an effect that lies on the idea that health 
services  promote  longevity. Specifically,  for  some levels of  t k ,  capital accumulation  and 
saving complement each other. Thus, for relatively low levels of initial capital endowment, 
saving is not sufficient enough to guarantee a positive rate of capital accumulation: capital 
per worker declines constantly until it rests on an equilibrium which is, essentially, a poverty 
trap. If, however, initial endowments are sufficient enough, the economy can escape the 
poverty trap because saving allows the economy to grow at positive (albeit declining) rates 
during the early stages of its transition. 
                                                 
10 When Assumption 1 does not hold, the only steady state equilibrium is  ˆ 0 k = . This is because the graph of 
(21) lies below the 45 degree line for all  0 t k > . Due to its limited interest, we choose not to discuss this case in 
detail.  Also,  notice  that,  for  this  particular  scenario  (i.e.,  = 0 υ ),  relaxing  Assumption  2  has  no  effect 
whatsoever on the results.   14 
 
Figure 1.  0 υ =  and  3 ˆ 0 ( ) 1 z k ¢ < <  
 
Figure 2.  0 υ =  and  3 ˆ 1 ( ) 0 z k ¢ - < <  
 
     So far, the results and their intuition are similar to those discussed in Chakraborty (2004). 
Nevertheless,  our  model  is  able  to  generate  richer  implications  for  the  dynamics  of  an 
economy whose history allows it to move on the right side of the natural threshold  2 ˆ k . The 
reason  for  such  implications  is  economic  activity’s  contribution  to  environmental 
degradation and the corresponding repercussions for health status and longevity. Particularly, 
 
  2 ˆ k  
 
 
1 t k +  
t k  
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for sufficiently high values of  t k  the negative effect of pollution on life expectancy and 
saving dominates the  positive  effect  of  publicly  provided  goods  and  services  on  health. 
Hence, the dynamics of capital accumulation are non monotonic and  3 ˆ k  may actually lie on 
the downward sloping part of  ( ) t z k . Furthermore, as Figure 3 illustrates, when the slope of 
the  graph  at  the  steady  state  3 ˆ k   is  steep  enough,  the  economy  may  converge  to  an 
equilibrium  in  which  capital  per  worker  oscillates  permanently  around  3 ˆ k   –  i.e.,  an 
equilibrium  with  a  permanent,  endogenously  determined  cycle.  In  terms  of  intuition,  a 
relatively high level of capital per worker implies relatively high pollution. The health status 
is affected negatively and, consequently, saving is reduced. Capital accumulation is mitigated, 
but this also implies that the extent of environmental degradation is mitigated as well. Next 
period’s health status improves and so is saving which promotes capital accumulation. This 
sequence of events may eventually become self repeating, thus generating an equilibrium 
with persistent cycles.     
   
Figure 3.  0 υ =  and  3 ˆ ( ) 1 z k ¢ < - : an example with a period 2 cycle 
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Let also  0.2, 0.3, 0.3, Γ 10, 1, 0.7, 0.2 τ γ p E φ χ = = = = = = = . Then at  0.682 λ =  a saddle 
node bifurcation occurs (see Devaney 2003, p.82); that is, the number of fixed points (steady 
states), except from the origin, is none for  0.682 λ < , one for  0.682 λ = and two for values 
of  0.682. λ >   In  particular,  if  0.682 λ <   the  origin  is  the  only  steady state  equilibrium 
(Assumption 1  is  not satisfied).  At  0.682 λ =   the  function  ( ) t z k   is  tangent  to  the 
0 45  
degree line and hence there is only one interior steady state. If  0.682 λ >  there are two 
interior  steady state  equilibria,  say  2 ˆ k   and  3 ˆ k .  The  lower  equilibrium,  2 ˆ k ,  is  repelling, 
whereas the stability of the higher equilibrium,  3 ˆ k , depends on the value of  . λ  For example, 
if  0.7 λ =   then  any  orbit  that  starts  in  the  neighbourhood  of  3 ˆ k   converges  to  it 
monotonically,  since  3 ˆ 0 ( ) 1 z k ¢ < < .  On  the  other  hand,  if  we  let  0.75 λ = ,  then  the 
convergence to  3 ˆ k  occurs through damped oscillations since  3 ˆ 0 ( ) 1 z k ¢ > > - . Next, suppose 
that  we  let  0.78 λ = .  Simple  calculations  show  that  the  stability  of  the  equilibrium  3 ˆ k  
changes since  3 ˆ ( ) 1 z k ¢ < - ; i.e.,  3 ˆ k  becomes a repelling equilibrium. At the same time there is 
a  period 2  cycle  { } 0.306,0.326 ,  which  is  stable  since  its  multiplier  is 
2 (0.306) z ¢ = 
2 (0.326) (0.306) (0.326) 0.452 1 z z z ¢ ¢ ¢ = = - > -   (
2 z   denotes  the  second  iterate  of  z ,  i.e., 
2( ) ( ( )) t t z k z z k = ). Next, suppose that we raise  λ  to  0.8 . Then again simple calculations 
reveal  that, while  3 ˆ k   remains  a  repelling equilibrium,  the  period 2  cycle has  become an 
unstable one (the value of its multiplier is lower than  1 - ). Instead, there is a period 4 cycle 
now, which is stable. This process continues as  λ  increases. In other words, the system 
undergoes a sequence of period doubling bifurcations (see Devaney 2003, p. 90); that is, 
there is an increasing sequence of bifurcation points, such that for values of λ between any 
two consecutive members of the sequence  n λ  and  1 n λ +  the prime  2 period
n -  solution is 
stable, while the periodic solutions of all other periods 
1 2,4, ,2
n- …  become unstable.   
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3.2   Dynamic Equilibrium with Active Pollution Abatement 
The  scenario  we  analyse  now  allows  the  government  to  actively  pursue  a  policy  of 
environmental preservation – i.e., we assume  0 1 υ < < . Therefore, the dynamics of capital 
accumulation are represented by the difference equation we originally obtained in (19).  
     Once more, we shall begin our formal analysis with the derivation of the model’s steady 
state equilibrium. The steady state implications are summarised in  
 
Lemma 2. Suppose that υτE p >  holds. Then, there exist two steady state equilibria  1 ˆ k  and  2 ˆ k , such 
than  1 ˆ 0 k =  and  2 ˆ 0 k > . The steady state  1 ˆ k  is locally asymptotically stable, while the steady state  2 ˆ k  is 
unstable. 
 
     Using  Lemma  2,  we  can  identify  the  economy’s  dynamic  behaviour  and  transitional 
properties in the long run. We do this through  
 
Proposition 2. Consider  0 0 k > . Then:  
(i)  If  0 2 ˆ k k < , the economy will converge to the poverty trap  1 ˆ 0 k = ;  
(ii)  If  0 2 ˆ k k > , the economy will eventually converge to a ‘long run growth’ equilibrium in which 
both  capital  per  worker  and  output  per  worker  grow  at  the  rate 
= - - -
+








     The  dynamics  of  the  economy  are  illustrated  in  Figure  4.  Similarly  to  the  previous 
scenario, the steady state  2 ˆ k  emerges as an endogenous threshold that determines long term 
prospects according to the initial stock of capital per worker. Once more, an economy which 
is initially endowed with resources below this threshold will degenerate towards the poverty 
trap. Naturally, the intuition behind this result is identical to the one provided in the case 
without pollution abatement. 
     What is particularly interesting, is the situation that occurs when the economy kick starts 
its transition from a point that lies above the endogenous threshold  2 ˆ k . Contrary to the case 
                                                 
11 Naturally, we assume that the value of  Γ  is sufficiently above unity so as to render the growth rate positive.   18 
where  0 υ = , in which capital per worker converges to an equilibrium with zero growth (that 
is, either a positive level for the stock of capital or a limit cycle), in this case the economy is 
able  to  sustain  a  positive  rate  of  economic  growth  in  the  long run.  The  reason  is  that 
pollution  abatement  limits  the  extent  to  which  economic  activity  causes  environmental 
damage. Thus, pollution abatement protects the population’s health against the damage from 
environmental degradation and, therefore, the saving behaviour of workers is not impeded 
as the economy grows. Combined with the effect of the learning by doing externality in the 
production technology, a policy of environmental preservation allows the social marginal 
return of capital to be high enough so as to guarantee a positive rate of capital accumulation 
that,  eventually,  allows  the  economy  to  achieve  balanced  growth  as  an  equilibrium 
outcome.
12   
 
Figure 4. 0 1 υ < <   
 
4   Some Important Implications 
In the preceding sections of this paper, we have examined the transitional dynamics and the 
long term  equilibrium  of  an  economy  under  two  opposite  scenarios  concerning  the 
                                                 
12 If the condition υτE p >  does not hold, the dynamic equilibrium of the economy resembles the one derived 
for  0 υ = . The restriction imposed with Assumption 2 is sufficient but not necessary for the results of Lemma 
2 and Proposition 2. Effectively, it ensures that only one endogenous threshold separates the two opposite 
convergence scenarios. In Appendix A5 we show that when this assumption is relaxed, it is possible that more 
equilibria emerge between the poverty trap and the long run growth equilibrium. Nevertheless, the implication 
regarding the economy’s ability to sustain a positive growth rate in the long run remains intact. 
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government’s engagement in policies that are designed to mitigate pollution and promote 
environmental  quality.  Apart  from  the  common  theme  of  multiple  equilibria  and  the 
existence of poverty traps (an outcome related to the positive complementarities between 
saving and investment for some levels of the capital stock), the two scenarios’ predictions 
concerning  the  long term  prospects  of  economies  that  escape  such  poverty  traps  are 
strikingly different. The purpose of this section is to compare and contrast these predictions 
in order to derive important implications that arise as a result of the government’s stance on 
activities of pollution abatement. 
     We begin with the implications concerning economic growth. As we have seen from 
equations (4) and (5), the labour’s contribution to aggregate production is augmented by a 
productivity variable which is driven by the presence of an economy wide, learning by doing 
externality similar to that used by Romer (1986). It is well known that, in standard dynamic 
general equilibrium models with production, such externalities allow the emergence of an 
equilibrium with ongoing output growth (e.g., Romer, 1986; Aghion and Howitt, 1998). In 
our framework, however, we have established that the learning by doing mechanism is not 
by itself sufficient to guaranteed growth in the long run. Indeed, such an equilibrium exists 
only  when  the  government  commits  sufficient  resources  towards  activities  that  abate 
pollution. Therefore, one significant implication from our analysis is given in  
 
Corollary 1. For an economy that avoids the poverty trap, pollution abatement is a complementary engine of 
long run economic growth.             
 
     This  idea  comes  in  stark  contrast  to  previously  held  views  concerning  the 
macroeconomic repercussions of pollution. In her influential paper, Stokey (1998) argued 
that the prospects of long run growth may be hampered as a result of the society’s need to 
implement policies that support the quality of the natural environment – policies that are 
costly  and,  therefore,  reduce  the  marginal  product  of  capital  to  the  extent  that  capital 
accumulation cannot be permanently sustained. Her model, however, does not incorporate 
the significant, and well documented, effects of environmental quality to the overall health 
characteristics of the population. By taking account of these effects and their consequence 
for saving behaviour, our model has reached a different conclusion: policies that preserve 
some  degree  of  environmental  quality  are,  actually,  essential  for  the  existence  of  an 
equilibrium with ongoing output growth.    20 
     Another important implication of our analysis is related to the existence of limit cycles. 
As we have seen, when pollution abatement is absent, it is possible for capital per worker to 
oscillate permanently around its positive steady state. Of course, such persistent fluctuations 
are  different  in  nature  from  cycles  whose  impulse  sources  may  be  exogenous  demand 
and/or supply disturbances – the type of disturbances considered in the RBC and New 
Keynesian  literatures.  In  our  model,  both  the  impulse  source  and  the  propagation 
mechanism of cycles rest on the presence of non monotonicity in the dynamics of capital 
accumulation. Thus, our framework shares more common features, among others, with the 
well known papers of Grandmont (1985) and Matsuyama (1999) – both of whom discuss 
and derive cycles as endogenously determined phenomena whose existence depends on an 
economy’s structural characteristics.  
     Naturally, policies that could eradicate such fluctuations are policies that would address 
the  source  of  non monotonicities  rather  than  counter cyclical  rules  designed  to  mitigate 
temporary  shifts  from  a  given  trend.  With  this  in  mind,  a  straightforward  comparison 
between our two different scenarios allows us to infer 
 
Corollary 2. For an economy that avoids the poverty trap, pollution abatement is a source of stabilisation, 
in the sense that it eliminates the possibility of permanent cycles.         
 
     Given  that  environmental  policy  has  an  indirect  positive  effect  on  health  and, 
consequently, life expectancy, our model derives implications which differ from those of 
Bhattacharya  and  Qiao  (2007).  In  their  model,  the  positive  complementarities  between 
private  and  public  health  spending  implies  that  there  is  a  trade off  between  saving  and 
private health expenditures. This trade off generates non monotonic capital dynamics, hence 
rendering health enhancing public policy a source of endogenous fluctuations. In our model, 
a policy that facilitates health improvements (albeit indirectly through pollution abatement) 
actually eliminates such fluctuations.   
     Finally, by contrasting the results of our two different scenarios, it is possible to provide a 
novel explanation on the relationship between cycles and economic growth. We summarise 
this implication in 
   21 
Corollary 3. The government’s stance on pollution abatement can generate a negative relationship between 
growth and cycles, in the sense that a policy supporting sustained long run growth automatically eliminates the 
likelihood of persistent cycles.        
 
     To the best of our knowledge, the only other theoretical analysis that derives implications 
on the relationship between cyclical fluctuations and economic growth, within a framework 
of (endogenous) limit cycles, is the model of Palivos and Varvarigos (2010). In their analysis, 
strategic interactions in the determination of human capital generate multiple equilibria, one 
of them being associated with permanent cycles. They conclude that, in the presence of such 
cycles, the growth rate is strictly lower compared to the one obtained under a stationary 
equilibrium. The  present paper’s  view  on  the issue is  rather  different:  we argue  that an 
economy that displays persistent fluctuations will not be able to achieve long run growth or, 
alternatively, an economy that sustains a positive growth permanently will not be subjected 
to cycles. In any case, it is the government’s engagement in environmentally friendly policies 
that, not solely but to a large extent, determines macroeconomic performance in the long 
term.   
 
5   Endogenous Allocation of Government Expenditure 
In this Section we analyse the case where the government allocates its spending between 
public health services and pollution abatement optimally.  To simplify the algebra we restrict 
our attention to the case where  = £1. φ χ  Accordingly, suppose that in every period the 
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     The solution to this maximisation problem is formally described in  
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     The result from Proposition 3 states that the government will find it optimal to initiate its 
efforts towards environmental preservation only at later stages of its development process. A 
similar result emerges in the analysis of Stokey (1998) where a central planner optimally 
decides  to  spend  resources  towards  pollution  abatement  after  the  economy  exceeds  a 
threshold level of income. However, the major difference of our framework, in comparison 
to  Stokey’s  (1998)  is,  once  more,  related  to  the  prospects  of  long run  growth  under 
environmental spending. This becomes apparent in  
 
Proposition 4. Consider  0 0 k > . If  t υ  is chosen endogenously, there is always a threshold level, say k , 
such that, as long as  k k 0 > , the economy will eventually converge to a ‘long run growth’ equilibrium in 
which both capital per worker and output per worker grow at a positive rate  = - - -
+







     In Appendix A7 we show that there may be two cases leading to the result of Proposition 
4.  These two cases depend on whether parameter values satisfy τE p 2 >  or  p τE p 2 > > .  
     In the former case, the dynamics of capital accumulation are monotonically increasing 
and there is only one non trivial steady state equilibrium, labelled as k2 ˆ ,  which is unstable. 
Once again, this steady state emerges as an endogenous threshold that determines long term 
prospects according to the initial stock of capital per worker (in terms of Proposition 4, it is 
k k 2 ˆ = ). Countries that start with an initial capital stock below this threshold will decline 
monotonically towards a poverty trap where the (stable) steady state is k1 ˆ 0 = . On the other 
hand, countries that start above this threshold level will experience smooth long run growth. 
Diagrammatically, equilibrium outcomes resemble those presented in Figure 4.  
     In  the  latter  case,  however,  outcomes  may  be  slightly  different  in  the  sense  that  an 
additional (stable) steady state equilibrium may emerge between the poverty trap and the 
long run growth equilibrium. If this happens, then an economy for which k k 0 <  need not 
necessarily fall into a poverty trap; instead, it may converge to a positive steady state level of   23 
capital per worker. Still, however, this will be a stationary equilibrium with no long run 
growth; achieving long run growth requires that  k k 0 > . Diagrammatically, the equilibrium 




     These details notwithstanding, we can conclude that, even with endogenous allocation of 
government  resources,  the  commitment  of  some  of  these  resources  towards  pollution 
abatement can allow some economies to achieve long run growth. Furthermore, notice that, 
in  comparison  to  the  case  where  υ  is  set  (permanently)  equal  to  zero,  the  endogenous 
allocation of public spending eliminates the possibility of endogenous fluctuations. Hence, it 
verifies the role of pollution abatement as a tool for stabilisation in our framework. 
                        
6   Summary and Conclusion 
We  constructed  and  presented  a  two period,  overlapping  generations  model  where  life 
expectancy is positively affected by the provision of public health services and by the quality 
of the natural environment. Environmental quality declines due to pollution – a by product 
of economic activity. We showed that, despite the presence of an aggregate learning by 
doing  externality,  the  economy  cannot  sustain  a  positive  growth  rate  in  the  long run  if 
resources  are  not  devoted  towards  environmental  preservation.  As  the  environment 
deteriorates without bound, the negative impact on life expectancy causes a reduction in 
   
 
 
1 t k +  
t k  
  0  
( ) t z k  
k    24 
saving  and,  therefore,  the  rate  of  capital  formation:  the  economy’s  capital  stock  either 
converges to a stationary level or oscillates permanently. An equilibrium with ongoing output 
growth is possible only if the government commits a sufficient amount of resources towards 
pollution abatement. Given that the possibility of cycles disappears in the latter scenario, we 
concluded that an active policy of environmental preservation in not only an important, 
complementary engine of long run growth but a powerful tool of stabilisation as well.  
     Our model showed that environmentally sustainable economic growth is possible even if 
the quality of the environment, which actually deteriorates with higher levels of production, 
is essential for economic outcomes via its importance for longevity. Moreover, our analysis 
did  not  resort  to  the  questionable  outcome  whereby  the  additively  separable  benefit  of 
pollution abatement exceeds the environmental cost of pollutant emissions, thus rendering 
economic growth a net contributor to environmental quality. In our model we used the far 
less restrictive assumption according to which abatement aims at reducing the extent of 
pollution: in overall, economic activity is still a net contributor to environmental degradation 
in  spite  of  the  resources  committed  to  abatement.  Nevertheless,  pollution  abatement  is 
critical in preserving a degree of environmental quality that is significant in maintaining a 
high enough social marginal product of capital that allows ongoing output growth. 
     We  view  our  analysis,  and  its  results,  as  pinpointing  the  possible  weaknesses  in  the 
prevailing,  opposing  views  concerning  the  relationship  between  economic  growth  and 
environmental quality. This is achieved by providing a moderate view according to which 
economic  growth  can  be  consistent  with  environmental  sustainability  and  vice  versa  – 
without the need to overstress the potential environmental benefits of economic growth. If 
anything,  it  is  the  preservation  of  environmental  quality  that  is  vital  in  supporting  ever 
increasing levels of income over time.                     
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A1   Proof of Lemma 1 
Using equation (21), we define the function 
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     Clearly, any interior steady state must satisfy  ˆ ˆ ˆ ( ) 1 ( ) J k k z k = Û = . From (A1.1), we have 
(0) J =0 and, by virtue of (8),  ( ) 0  / Γ t t J k k E p = " ³ . Thus, for an interior steady state to 
exist, there must be at least one k ɶ such that  ( ) 1 J k ³ ɶ . When this condition holds with strict 
inequality then there will be at least two interior steady states; otherwise, there will not be 
any interior equilibrium at all (see Figure A1).  
 
Figure A1. Interior solutions require  ( ) 1 J k > ɶ  
 
     Combining (A1.1) with (1), (2), (7), (8) and (9) allows us to derive  
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        For  0 / Γ t k E p £ £ , the sign of (A1.3) determines the sign of  ( ) t J k ¢ . Straightforward 
factorisation allows us to write (A1.3) as 
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     The preceding analysis implies that there exists a unique  (0, / Γ) k E p Î ɶ  such that 
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i.e.,  ( ) J k ɶ  is a global maximum. We can use this result to identify the parameter combination 
that allows the existence of interior equilibria. Particularly, we can solve ( Γ ) ( Γ )
φ χ τ k E p k - ɶ ɶ   
using  /( ) Γ k φE φ χ p = + ɶ . Doing so, we derive  ( / ) [ /( )]  
φ χ φ χ φτ p χ E φ χ
+ + = . Hence, by 
the Intermediate Value Theorem, Assumption 1 is a sufficient condition for the existence of 
interior equilibria. Moreover, if this condition holds, then there exist two interior steady state 
equilibria 
3 2 ˆ ˆ 0 k k > >  satisfying 
3 2 ˆ ˆ k k k > > ɶ , i.e., 
2 ˆ ( ) 0 J k ¢ >  and 
3 ˆ ( ) 0 J k ¢ < .  









z k k z k
J k
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¢ - ¢ = .  (A1.4) 
     Given (A1.4), 
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2 2 ˆ ˆ ( ) ( ) z k J k ¢ > ⇒ 
 
2 ˆ ( ) 1 z k ¢ > , 
because  =
2 ˆ ( ) 1 J k . Thus, 
2 ˆ k  is an unstable equilibrium.  
     Similarly, (A1.4) implies that 
3 ˆ ( ) 0 J k ¢ <  is equivalent to 
3 ˆ ( ) 1 z k ¢ < . In this case, however, 
we cannot make any definite conclusions concerning the stability of this equilibrium as we 
do not yet know whether the dynamics generated by equation (21) are monotonic. For this 
reason, let us return to the transition equation  1 ( ) t t k z k + = . Given (21), we can see that 
(0) 0  z = ,  ( ) 0  / Γ t t z k k E p = " ³  and  ( ) 0  t z k >  for  (0, / Γ) t k E p Î . Thus, the dynamics 
of capital accumulation may not be non monotonic which means that, indeed, the stability 
properties of 
3 ˆ k  cannot be determined with certainty. Particularly, 
3 ˆ k  is a stable long run 
equilibrium if 
3 ˆ ( ) 1 z k ¢ > - ; otherwise, i.e., if 
3 ˆ ( ) 1 z k ¢ < - , the equilibrium 
3 ˆ k  is an unstable 
one.  
     In  our  preceding  analysis,  we  have  established  that  (0) 0  z = .  Of  course,  this  result 
indicates that 
1 ˆ 0 k =  is a steady state. Moreover,   
  ( ) ( ) ( ) t t t t z k J k k J k ¢ ¢ = + , 












   and    ( ) 0, t t J k k ¢ =   
it follows that 
1 ˆ ( ) (0) 0 z k z ¢ ¢ = = , i.e., 
1 ˆ 0 k =  is a super stable equilibrium.   ■ 
 
A2   Proof of Proposition 1 
The first part of Proposition 1 follows from the results of Lemma 1 in which we have shown 
that  1 ˆ 0 k =  is an asymptotically stable equilibrium while  2 ˆ 0 k >  is an unstable one. Hence, 
given  2 1 ˆ ˆ k k > , we can safely conclude that, for any  0 2 ˆ k k < ,  it is  1 ( )   t t t k z k k + = < , i.e., the 
economy’s capital per worker will constantly decline until it converges to the poverty trap 
1 ˆ 0 k = . 
     For the second part of Proposition 1 we can once more utilise the results from Lemma 1. 
In particular, let us consider the case where  3 ˆ k  is an asymptotically stable equilibrium, i.e.,   30 
the  case  for  which  3 ˆ ( ) 1 z k ¢ < .  Given  3 2 ˆ ˆ k k > ,  we  may  conclude  that  for  0 2 ˆ k k >   the 
transitional dynamics imply that  3 ˆ lim t t k k















( ) ˆ lim lim 1 lim 1 lim ( ) 1 ( ) 1 0
t t
t t t t t t
t t
k z k
θ J k J k
k k
+
+ ®¥ ®¥ ®¥ ®¥
   
= - = - = - = - =    
   
.  (A2.1) 
Therefore, the economy will converge (either monotonically or through damped oscillations) 
to a long run equilibrium with a positive stock for capital per worker, but zero growth. 
     Now, let us consider the possibility that  3 ˆ ( ) 1 z k ¢ £ - . Although  3 ˆ k  is an unstable steady 
state equilibrium, it is well known that when the transition equation is non monotonic and 
its slope at the steady state is negative and sufficiently steep (that is, below  1 - ), then the 
dynamical system may exhibit periodic equilibria. In terms of our model, consider a sequence 
of  n  discrete points along the 
0 45  line, denoted  η k
⌣
 for  {1,2,..., 1, , 1,... } η i i i n = - + , such 
that  1 1 3 1 ˆ ... ... i i i n k k k k k k - + < < < < < < <
⌣ ⌣ ⌣ ⌣ ⌣
















If,  for  0 2 ˆ k k > ,  the  capital  stock  passes  repeatedly  through  the  points  η k
⌣
  during  its 
transition,  then  the  economy  converges  to  a  period n   cycle  where  the  sequence  η k
⌣
 
represents periodic (rather than stationary) equilibria. Indeed, as long as  ¢ < - 3 ˆ ( ) 1 z k , the 
function  ( ) t z k  satisfies the following  
 
Theorem (Azariadis, 1993, 86-88). Suppose 0 and  ˆ 0 k >  are fixed points of the scalar system 
+ = 1 ( ) t t k z k  in which  + + Ê ® ℝ ℝ : z X  and  Î
1. z C  Suppose also that there exists a  > ˆ b k such 
that  > ( ) b z b  and  >
2( ), b z b  where 
2 z  is the second iterate of  z . Then  ¢ < - ˆ ( ) 1 z k  is a sufficient 
condition for the existence of a period 2 cycle { } 1 2 , k k
⌣ ⌣
 that satisfies  < < <
⌣ ⌣
1 2 ˆ k k k b . 
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     Thus the system  + = 1 ( ) t t k z k  exhibits (at least) a period 2 cycle. To apply this Theorem to 
our case, let  3 ˆ ˆ k k =  and  = / Γ b E p . Naturally, the growth rate  1 t θ +  will be positive during 
phases of the transition for which  [1, ] η i Î  but negative during phases of the transition for 
which  ( , ] η i n Î . Hence, a long run equilibrium with a constantly positive growth rate does 
not exist.     ■      
 
A3   Proof of Lemma 2 
Consider again the function 
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Β [(1 ) Γ ]
1 Γ ( )
( ) (1 )(1 )Γ
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υ τ k E
υτ k z k
J k τ γ
k p k
υ τ k E
υτ k
   
  - -     +     = = - -
   
  + - -     +    
.  (A3.1) 
Given the properties of  Β( ) t h  and the restriction υτE p > , it can be easily established that 
(0) J =0  and  ( ) (1 )(1 )Γ /(1 ) J τ γ λ λ ¥ = - - + .  An  interior  steady  state  must  satisfy 
ˆ ˆ ˆ ( ) 1 ( ) J k k z k = ⇒ = .  Therefore,  Assumption  1  represents  a  sufficient  condition  for  the 
existence  of  an  interior  equilibrium.  This  is  because  Β( ) λ ¥ =   and  Β( )/[1 Β( )] t t h h +   is 
increasing in  t h ; therefore  Β( ) λ > .    
     Differentiating (A3.1) yields 
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= - - -   +  
 
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φ υ τ υ τ k E
dk υτ k
p k p
χ υ τ k E
υτ k υτ k
  (A3.2) 
Substituting (A3.2) in (A3.1) gives us 
  2
(1 )(1 )ΓΒ( ) Γ
( ) [(1 ) Γ ] Ξ( )





τ γ h p k
J k υ τ k E k
h υτ k
  ¢ - - ¢ = - -   + +  
.  (A3.3) 
















.  (A3.4) 
   
     Obviously, the sign of  ( ) t J k ¢  depends on the sign of  Ξ( ) t k  in (A3.4). Particularly, for 
this  to  be  non negative,  it  must  be  Ξ( ) 0 t k ³ .  After  some  algebraic  manipulation,  the 












υτE p υτ υτE p υτ
 
- + -  
  + + ³
- -
.  (A3.5) 
     As long as 2 ( )/ υτE p φ χ φ > + , which is true for υτE p >  and  χ φ £  (Assumption 2), the 
above  expression  holds  with  strict  inequality  and,  by  virtue  of  (A3.3)  and  (A3.4), 
( ) 0  t t J k k ¢ > " . Hence, there is only one interior steady state 
2 ˆ k  with 
2 ˆ ( ) 0 J k ¢ > . Moreover, 
it can be easily checked that 
2 2 ˆ ˆ ( ) 0 ( ) 1 J k z k ¢ ¢ > ⇒ > , i.e., the interior steady state is unstable.  
     Next,  notice  from  equation  (19)  that    (0) 0 z = ;  therefore 
1 ˆ 0 k =   is  a  steady  state. 
Moreover    
( ) ( ) ( ) t t t t z k J k k J k ¢ ¢ = + , 
and, since from equations (A3.3) and (A3.4)  
 
0 limΞ( ) 0 t t k k k
® =    and    ( ) 0, t t J k k ¢ =   
it follows that 
1 ˆ ( ) (0) 0 z k z ¢ ¢ = = , i.e., 
1 ˆ 0 k =  is a super stable equilibrium.   ■ 
 
A4   Proof of Proposition 2 
The first part of Proposition 2 is mainly a by product of results established in Lemma 2. 
Specifically,  given  that  1 ˆ 0 k =   is  an  asymptotically  stable  equilibrium  and  2 ˆ 0 k >   is  an 
unstable one, for any  0 2 ˆ k k < ,  we have  1   t t k k + < for all subsequent steps of the transition. 
Hence, the economy’s stock of capital per worker will constantly decline until it converges to 
the poverty trap  1 ˆ 0 k = . 
     For the second part, we can begin by using (19) and (20) so as to write the gross growth 
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  - -     +     = + = - -
   
  + - -     +    
,  (A4.1) 
for which Appendix A3 establishes that  1 1 1 1 t t t k k θ + + > ⇒ + >  (as long as 
2
0 ˆ k k > ) because 
the dynamics of capital accumulation are monotonic. Therefore, (A4.1) can be eventually 









= + Õ .  (A4.2) 
     From  equation  (A4.2)  we  can  verify  that  lim t t k k¥ ®¥ = ® ¥.  Therefore,  we  can  use 
equation (A4.1) to establish that  
  1 lim t t θ θ + ¥ ®¥ = =  
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1 Γ
lim (1 )(1 )Γ 1
Γ















υ τ k E
υτ k
®¥
     
    - -     +       - - - =  
     




Β [(1 ) Γ ]
1 Γ
(1 )(1 )Γ 1
Γ



















   
  - -     +     - - - =
   
  + - -     +    
 





- - - =
+
. 
Since  (1 )(1 )Γ /(1 ) 1 τ γ λ λ - - + >   holds  by  assumption,  then  ˆ 0 θ > :  asymptotically,  the 
economy will converge to a balanced growth path where capital per worker (and, therefore, 
output per worker) grow at a rate  ˆ θ .   ■    
 
A5   Analysis of the Model when Assumption A2 is Relaxed 
Our  basic  analysis  utilised  the  restriction  χ φ £ . In  this  part  of  the  Appendix,  we  shall 
demonstrate that all the main implications of our model survive even when this restriction is   34 
relaxed. To begin with, we can readily verify that this restriction has no bearing at all for the 
analysis and results of the case with no pollution abatement ( 0 υ = ). Indeed, Assumption 2 
was not used in the proofs of Lemma 1 and Proposition 1. For this reason, we shall focus on 
the case where policies of pollution abatement are active.  
     The main repercussion from relaxing  χ φ £  relates to the possibility that we may have 
2 ( )/ υτE p φ χ φ < + .  Therefore,  the  inequality  Ξ( ) 0 t k ³   which  we  examined  in  equation 
(A3.4) (see Appendix A3, proof of Lemma 2) may not hold for every  t k . Using obvious 
definitions,  we  can  rewrite  the  left hand  side  of  (A3.5)  in  the  form 














= .  (A5.2)  
Notice  that,  for  2 ( )/ υτE p φ χ φ < + ,  it  is  0 ζ < .  Moreover,  after  some  tedious  but 
straightforward  algebra  it  can  be  shown  that 
2 4 0 ζ δ - > ,  i.e.,  both  roots  are  real  and 
positive. Therefore, we can use (A5.1) and (A5.2) in (A3.4) so as to infer that, given (A3.3), 
we have     
 
0 for












 ¢ < < < 
> > 
. 
     Given  (0) 0 J =  and  ( ) (1 )(1 )Γ /(1 ) J τ γ λ λ ¥ = - - + , the preceding analysis shows that 
k-  corresponds to local maximum while k+ corresponds to a local minimum. Consequently, 
there may be three interior steady state solutions from which the lowest and the highest are 
unstable.  Thus,  the  difference  with  the  results  of  Section  3.2  is  that  we  may  have  an 
additional, asymptotically stable steady state for the stock of capital per worker, separating 
the poverty trap and the long run growth equilibrium. Furthermore, in this case we would 
have  two  endogenous  thresholds  –  one  separating  the  poverty  trap  and  the  no growth 
equilibrium while the other separating the no growth and the long run growth equilibria. 
Figures 6 and 7, below, illustrate such outcomes.   
    Notice that, although the situation illustrated in Figures A2 and A3 is possible, under 
certain  conditions  the  model’s  equilibrium  may  still  be  qualitatively  identical  to  the  one   35 
derived in Section 3.2. Particularly, this happens if either  ( ) 1 J k- <  or  ( ) 1 J k+ >  (see Figures 
A4  and  A5,  respectively).  In  both  cases,  there  can  only  be  one  steady  state, 
2 ˆ k ,  with 
2 2 ˆ ˆ ( ) 0 ( ) 1 J k z k ¢ ¢ > ⇒ > ,  i.e.,  an  unstable  steady  state.  Therefore,  the  model’s  behaviour 
resembles the one described in the main part of the paper.  
 




Figure A3. The dynamics of capital accumulation with three interior steady states 
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Figure A5.  ( ) 1 J k+ >  
                     
 
A6   Proof of Proposition 3 
The maximisation problem in (22) leads to  
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- + +     = .  (A6.1) 
Note that a sufficient condition for  t υ
* 1 <  is  > τE p . It is also straightforward to establish 
that the non negativity constraint  t υ









= + -  
 
⌢ .  (A6.2) 
                                                                                                                                            ■ 
 
A7   Proof of Proposition 4 
Using the result in Proposition 3 and substituting (A6.1), together with (8), (9) and (10), in 
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  (A7.1) 
     Appropriate substitution of (A6.2) in (A7.1) reveals that the function  t h  is continuous; 
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h k z k
J k τ γ
k k h
+ = = = - -
+
.   
Obviously, for  t k k £ ⌢ the properties of this expression are identical to those analysed in 
Appendix A1. Now let us examine the properties for  t k k > ⌢ . First of all, we can use the 
previous analysis to establish that  J τ γ λ λ ( ) (1 )(1 )Γ /(1 ) 1 ¥ = - - + > . Furthermore, it is   
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  { }
- - - = + -





φh E τ k Eτ p k p
dk
   
Hence,  
¢ > ( ) 0 t J k     iff    t
p
k κ














= ɶ . Of course, as long 
as k k > ɶ ⌢, the switch in regime from  t υ
* 0 =  to  t υ
* 0 >  occurs in the upward sloping part of 
t J k ( ). After some straightforward algebra, we can show that k k κ > > ɶ ⌢  iff  2 τE p > .  
     Assume for the moment that  2 τE p > . Notice that if  , t k k < ⌢  then the function  0 ( ) t v J k =  
is monotonically increasing since  . t k k k < < ɶ ⌢  Also, if  , t k k > ⌢  then the function  * ( ) t v v J k
=  is 
again monotonically increasing because  . t k k κ > > ⌢  Thus, as long as  2 τE p > , it is  ¢ > ( ) 0 t J k  
for every  t k 0 > . Given that  J(0) 0 =  (recall that for  t k k £ ⌢ it is  t υ
* 0 = ) and  J( ) 1 ¥ > , there 
is only one steady state equilibrium, say k , which is clearly unstable. An analysis similar to 
that in Appendix A4 suffices to establish that for k k 0 > , the economy can achieve long run 
economic growth.  
     Next,  let  us  consider  the  case  where  2p τE p > > .  In  this  case  k k κ < < ɶ ⌢   and  the 
behaviour of the system may or may not be qualitatively identical to the one described 
above. Based on the previous results we can infer that the function  ( ) t J k  is increasing over 
the interval (0, ) k ɶ , decreasing over the interval ( , ) k κ ɶ  and increasing for values of  t k  greater 
than  . κ  Hence, if  J κ ( ) 1 > , then there is again one unstable interior steady state, k , and for 
k k 0 > , the economy will achieve long run economic growth.  Nevertheless, if  J κ ( ) 1 < , 
then it is easy to check that, in addition to the stable steady state k1 ˆ 0 = , there will be three 
interior  steady states  k k k 2 3 ˆ ˆ < <   from  which  2 ˆ (0, ) k k Î ɶ   and  k κ >   will  be  unstable 
(because  J k J k 2 ˆ ( ), ( ) 0 ¢ ¢ > ) but  3 ˆ ( , ) k k κ Î ɶ  may be stable since  J k3 ˆ ( ) 0 ¢ < . Once more, for 
k k 0 >  the economy will attain positive growth in the long run. For  k k 0 < , however, the 
economy may converge to k3 ˆ 0 >  instead of the poverty trap.   ■ 